Abstract A multicast game is a network design game modelling how selfish noncooperative agents build and maintain one-to-many network communication. There is a special source node and a collection of agents located at corresponding terminals. Each agent is interested in selecting a route from the special source to its terminal minimizing the cost. The mutual influence of the agents is determined by a cost sharing mechanism, which evenly splits the cost of an edge among all the agents using it for routing. In this paper we provide several algorithmic and complexity results on finding a Nash equilibrium minimizing the value of Rosenthal potential. Let n be the number of agents and G be the communication network. We show that for a given strategy profile s and integer k ≥ 0, there is a local search algorithm which in time n O(k) · |G| O(1) finds a better strategy profile, if there is any, in a k-exchange neighbourhood of s. In other words, the algorithm decides if Rosenthal potential can be decreased by changing strategies of at most k agents. The running time of our local search algorithm is essentially tight: unless F P T = W [1], for any function f (k), searching of the k-neighbourhood cannot be done in time f (k) · |G| O(1) . We also show that an equilibrium with minimum potential can be found in 3 n · |G| O(1) time.
Introduction
Modern networks are often designed and used by non-cooperative individuals with diverse objectives. A considerable part of Algorithmic Game Theory focuses on optimization in such networks with selfish users [2, 6, 9, 13, 14, 17, 22, 23] .
In this paper we study the conceptually simple but mathematically rich costsharing model introduced by Anshelevich et al. [3, 4] , see also [16, Chapter 12] . In a variant of the cost-sharing game, which was called by Chekuri et al. the multicast game [5] , the network is represented by a weighted directed graph with a distinguished source node r, and a collection of n agents located at corresponding terminals. Each agent is trying to select a cheapest route from r to its terminal. The mutual influence of the players is determined by a cost sharing mechanism identifying how the cost of each edge in the network is shared among the agents using this edge. When h agents use an edge e of cost c e , each of them has to pay c e /h. This is a very natural cost sharing formula which is also the outcome of the Shapley value.
The multicast game belongs to the widely studied class of congestion games. This class of games was defined by Rosenthal [21] , who also proved that every congestion game has a Nash equilibrium. Rosenthal showed that for every congestion game it is possible to define a potential function which decreases if a player improves its selfish cost. Best-response dynamics in these games always lead to a set of paths that forms a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, every local minimum of Rosenthal potential corresponds to a Nash equilibrium and vice versa. However, while we know that the multicast game always has a Nash equilibrium, the number of iterations in bestresponse dynamics achieving an equilibrium can be exponential (see [3, Theorem 5 .1]), and it is an important open question if any Nash equilibrium can be found in polynomial time. The next step in the study of Rosenthal potential was done by Anshelevich et al. [3] , who showed that Rosenthal potential can be used not only for proving the existence of a Nash equilibrium but also to estimate the quality of equilibrium. Anshelevich et al. defined the price of stability, as the ratio of the best Nash equilibrium cost and the optimum network cost, the social optimum. In particular, the cost of a Nash equilibrium minimizing Rosenthal potential is within log n-factor of the social optimum, and thus the global minimum of the potential brings to a cheap equilibrium. The computational complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium achieving the bound of log n relative to the social optimum is still open, while computing the global minimum of the Rosenthal potential is NP-hard [3, 5] .
Our results.
In this paper we analyze the following local search problem. Given a strategy profile s, we ask whether a profile with a smaller value of Rosenthal potential can be found in a k-exchange neighbourhood of s, which is the set of all profiles that can be obtained from s by changing strategies of at most k players. Our motivation to study this problem is two-fold.
• If we succeed in finding some Nash equilibrium, say by implementing bestresponse dynamics, which is still far from the social optimum, it is an important question if the already found equilibrium can be used to find a better one efficiently. Local search heuristic in this case is a natural approach.
• Since the number of iterations in best-response dynamics scenario can be exponential (see [3, Theorem 5 .1]), it can be useful to combine the best-response dynamics with a heuristic that at some moments tries to make "larger jumps", i.e., instead of decreasing Rosenthal potential by changing strategy of one player, to decrease the potential by changing in one step strategies of several players.
Let us remark that the number of paths, and thus strategies, every player can select from, is exponential, so the size of the search space also can be exponential. Since the size of k-exchange neighbourhood is exponential, it is not clear a priori, if searching of a smaller value of Rosenthal potential in a k-exchange neighbourhood of a given strategy profile can be done in polynomial time. We show that for a fixed k, the local search can be performed in polynomial time. The running time of our algorithm is
, where n is the total number of players 1 . As a subroutine, our algorithm uses a fixed-parameter algorithm computing in time 3 k · |G| O(1) the minimum value of Rosenthal potential that can be achieved by changing strategies of at most k agents if a set of k agents whose strategies could be modified is given. We find this auxiliary algorithm to be interesting in its own because it implies that an equilibrium with minimum potential can be found in 3 n · |G| O(1) time. It is known that for a number of local search algorithms, exploration of the k-exchange neighbourhood can be done by fixed-parameter tractable (in k) algorithms [10, 18, 24] . We show that, unfortunately, this is not the case for the local search of Rosenthal potential minimum. We use tools from Parameterized Complexity, to show that the running time of our local search algorithm is essentially tight: unless
Preliminaries
Graphs. We consider finite directed and undirected graphs without loops or multiple edges. The vertex set of a (directed) graph G is denoted by V (G), the edge set of an undirected graph and the arc set of a directed graph G is denoted by E(G). To distinguish edges and arcs, the edge with two end-vertices u, v is denoted by uv, and we write (u, v) for the corresponding arc. Let G be a directed graph. For a vertex We say that a walk (path) with end-vertices u and v is a (u, v)-walk (path). We say that a subdigraph T of G is an out-tree if T is a directed tree with only one vertex r of in-degree zero (called the root). The vertices of T of out-degree zero are called leaves.
Multicast game and Rosenthal potential.
A network is modeled by a directed G = (V , E) graph. There is a special root or source node r ∈ V . There are n multicast users, players, and each player has a specified terminal node t i (several players can have the same terminals). A strategy s i for player i is a path P i from r to t i in G. We denote by the set of players and by S i the finite set of strategies of player i, which is the set of all paths from r to t i . The joint strategy space S = S 1 × S 2 × · · · × S n is the Cartesian product of all the possible strategy profiles. At any given moment, a strategy profile (or a configuration) of the game s ∈ S is the vector of all the strategies of the players, s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ). Notice that for a given strategy profile s, several players can use paths that go through the same edge. For each edge e ∈ E and a positive integer h, we have a cost c e (h) ∈ R of the edge e for each player who uses a path containing e, provided that exactly h players share e. With each player i, we associate the cost function c i mapping a strategy profile s ∈ S to real numbers, i.e., c i : S → R. For a strategy profile s ∈ S, let n e (s) be the number of players using the edge e in s. Then the cost the i-th player has to pay is
c e (n e (s)), and the total cost of s is
Rosenthal [21] proposed the study of the following potential function as a way of showing that a wide class of noncooperative games posess pure Nash equilibria. A potential of a strategy profile s ∈ S, or equivalently, the set of paths (P 1 , . . . , P n ), is defined as:
In this paper, we are especially interested in the case where the cost of every edge is split evenly between the players sharing it, i.e, the payment of player i for edge e is c e (h) = c e h for c e ∈ R. Respectively, Rosenthal potential of a strategy profile s ∈ S is
where H(h) = 1 + 1/2 + 1/3 + · · · + 1/h is the h-th Harmonic number. For a strategy profile s ∈ S and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we denote by s −i the strategy profile of the players j = i, i.e.
to denote the strategy profile identical to s, except that the ith player uses strategȳ s i instead of s i . Similarly, for a subset of players 0 , we define s − 0 , the profile of players j ∈ 0 . For a strategy profile σ of players in 0 , i.e., for an element of Cartesian product of S i for i ∈ 0 , we denote by (s − 0 , σ ) the strategy profile of n players obtained from s by changing the strategies of players in 0 to σ . A strategy profile s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium if no player i ∈ can benefit from unilaterally deviating from his action to another action, i.e.,
∀i ∈ and ∀s
The crucial property of Rosenthal potential is that each step performed by a player improving his payoff also decreases (see [16, 21] ). Consequently, if admits a minimum value in a strategy profile, this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. We say that a strategy profile s * is optimal if it gives the minimum value of the potential, i.e., for any other strategy profile s, (s) ≥ (s * ).
Parameterized complexity. We briefly review the relevant concepts of parameterized complexity theory that we employ. For deeper background on the subject see the books by Downey and Fellows [7] , Flum and Grohe [12] , and Niedermeier [20] .
In the classical framework of P vs NP, there is only one measurement (the overall input size) that frames the distinction between efficient and inefficient algorithms, and between tractable and intractable problems. Parameterized complexity is essentially a two-dimensional sequel, where in addition to the overall input size n, a secondary measurement k (the parameter) is introduced, with the aim of capturing the contributions to problem complexity due to such things as typical input structure, sizes of solutions, goodness of approximation, etc. Here, the parameter is deployed as a measurement of the amount of current solution modification allowed in a local search step. The parameter can also represent an aggregate of such bounds.
The central concept in parameterized complexity theory is the concept of fixedparameter tractability (FPT), that is solvability of the parameterized problem in time f (k) · n O (1) . The importance is that such a running time isolates all the exponential costs to a function of the parameter only.
The main hierarchy of parameterized complexity classes is
The formal definition of classes W [t] is technical, and, in fact, irrelevant to the scope of this paper. For our purposes it suffices to say that a problem is in a class if it is FPT-reducible to a complete problem in this class. Given two parameterized problems and , an FPT reduction from to maps an instance (I, k) of to an instance (I , k ) of such that
) (I, k) is a YES-instance of if and only if (I , k )
is a YES-instance of , and (3) the mapping can be computed in FPT time.
Hundreds of natural problems are known to be complete for the aforementioned classes, and W [1] is considered the parameterized analog of NP, because the k-STEP HALTING PROBLEM for nondeterministic Turing machines of unlimited nondeterminism (trivially solvable by brute force in time O(n k )) is complete for W [1] . Thus, the statement F P T = W [1] serves as a plausible complexity assumption for proving intractability results in parameterized complexity. INDEPENDENT SET, parameterized by solution size, is a more combinatorial example of a problem complete for W [1] . We refer the interested reader to the books by Downey and Fellows [7] or Flum and Grohe [12] for a more detailed introduction to the hierarchy of parameterized problems.
Local Search. Local search algorithms are among the most common heuristics used to solve computationally hard optimization problems. The common method of local search algorithms is to move from solution to solution by applying local changes. Books [1, 19] provide a nice introduction to the wide area of local search. Recall that the k-exchange neighborhood of a strategy profile s is the set of all profiles that can be obtained from s by changing strategies of at most k players, and the best response is the strategy (or strategies) which produces the most favorable outcome for a player, taking other players' strategies as given. Respectively, the best response dynamic is the following process. We start from an arbitrary strategy profile s. Then each player i in turn is given a possibility to modify his strategy to decrease the cost that he has to pay. We repeat this, giving all players a chance to change. We stop once we go through an entire round of players and nobody wants to change. Because each step performed by a player improving his payoff also decreases the Rosenthal potential , the best-response dynamics in congestion games corresponds to local search in 1-exchange neighborhood minimizing Rosenthal potential .
For two strategy profiles s 1 , s 2 ∈ S, we define the Hamming distance D(s 1 , s 2 ) = |s 1 s 2 | between s 1 and s 2 , that is the number of players implementing different strategies in s 1 and s 2 . We define arena as a directed graph G with root vertex r, a multiset of target vertices t 1 , . . . , t and for every edge e of the graph a cost function c e : Z + → R + ∪ {0} such that c e (h) ≥ c e (h + 1) for h ≥ 1. We study the following parameterized version of the local search problem for multicast.
Minimizing Rosenthal Potential
The aim of this section is to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 The p-LOCAL SEARCH ON POTENTIAL problem is solvable in time
Let us remark that in particular, if is Rosenthal's potential, and hence the cost functions are of the special type c e (h) = c e h , the p-LOCAL SEARCH ON POTENTIAL problem can be solved within the running time of Theorem 3.1.
Recall that a strategy profile s * is optimal if it gives the minimum value of the potential, i.e., for any other strategy profile s, (s) ≥ (s * ). If edge-sharing is profitable, then we can make the following observation about the structure of optimal strategies. Let G be a directed graph. Let also s = (P 1 , . . . , P | | ) be a strategy profile. We say that s uses the arcs ∪ | | i=1 E(P i ), and for a positive integer C, s uses C arcs if the union T of the paths P i contains exactly C arcs. 
Lemma 3.2 Let
cannot occur. Assume that (2) holds. We claim that then the i-th player can improve his strategy and, consequently, can be decreased, which will contradict the optimality of s. Denote by P the (r, t i )-walk obtained from P i by replacing path P v i by P v j . Notice that P is not necessarily a path as P v j can contain vertices and arcs of the (v, t i )-subpath of P i . Let w be the first vertex of P v j that is a vertex of the (v, t i )-subpath of P i . We denote by P the (r, t i )-path obtained by the concatenation of the (r, w)-subpath of P v j and the (w, t i )-subpath of P i . Notice that the set of arcs used by P is a subset of arcs used by P , i.e., P is obtained from P by possibly removing some loops. Let the strategy profile s = (s −i , P ). This profile uses ares that were used by s. Hence, it uses at most C arcs. By non-negativity of c e (h), the new cost for the i-th player is equal to e∈E (P ) c e (n e (s )) =
e∈E(P )∩E(P i ) c e (n e (s)) + e∈E(P )\E(P i ) c e (n e (s) + 1) ≤ e∈E(P )∩E(P i ) c e (n e (s)) + e∈E(P )\E(P i )
c e (n e (s) + 1).
Since for each e ∈ E and h ≥ 1, we have c e (h) ≥ c e (h + 1), e∈E(P )\E(P i ) c e (n e (s) + 1) ≤ e∈E(P )\E(P i ) c e (n e (s)).
Therefore,
e∈E(P ) c e (n e (s )) ≤ e∈E(P ) c e (n e (s)).
By (2) 
(n e (s)).
By the same arguments as above, we can replace P j by a (r, t j )-path P in the walk obtained from P j by the replacement of P v j by P v i without increasing . Notice that s can have many paths that enter v by arcs that are different from the arc in P i and, in particular, many paths can enter v via the same arc as P j , But then we repeat the described operation for each path P h in s with with this property. The modified strategy uses only arcs that were used in s. Therefore, this is a strategy profile that uses at most C arcs, but at least one arc that enters v is not used. It contradicts the choice of s. Hence, T is an out-tree rooted in r.
We use Lemma 3.2 to find an optimal strategy profile using the approach proposed by Dreyfus and Wagner [8] for the STEINER TREE problem.
Theorem 3.3 Given an arena as input, the minimum value of a potential can be found in time 3 | | · |G| O(1)
. The algorithm can also construct the corresponding optimal strategy profile s * within the same time complexity.
Proof We give a dynamic programming algorithm. For simplicity, we only describe how to find the minimum of , but it is straightforward to modify the algorithm to obtain the corresponding strategy profile.
Let T = {t 1 , . . . , t | | } be the multiset of terminals. We construct partial solutions for subsets X ⊆ T . Also, while at the end we are interested in the answer for the source r, our partial solutions are constructed for all vertices of G. For a vertex u ∈ V (G) and a multiset X ⊆ T , let X u denote the version of the game, in which only players associated with X build paths from u to their respective terminals. Therefore, we are interested in the game T r . For a non-negative integer m, we define (u, X, m) as the minimum value of the potential (s) in the game X u , taken over all strategy profiles s such that the union of paths in s contains at most m arcs (we say that s uses arc e if it is contained in some path from s). We assume that (u, X, m) = +∞ if there are no feasible strategy profiles. Notice that by Lemma 3.2, the number of arcs used in an optimal strategy in the original problem is at most |V (G)| − 1. Hence, our aim is to compute (r, T , |V (G)| − 1).
Clearly, (u, ∅, m) = 0 for all u ∈ V and m ≥ 0. For non-empty X and m = 0, (u, X, 0) = 0 if all terminals in X are equal to u, and (u, X, 0) = +∞ otherwise. We need the following claim.
Claim 1 For X = ∅ and m ≥ 1, (u, X, m) satisfies the following equation: Proof Let
We prove that that is optimal among those using at most m 1 arcs, and a strategy s * 2 in the game Y v that is optimal among those using at most m 2 arcs. Of course, the potential of s * 1 is equal to (u, X\Y, m 1 ), while the potential of s * 2 is equal to (u, Y, m 2 ). We construct the strategy profile s in the game X u as follows. For each terminal t j ∈ X \ Y , the players use the (u, t j )-path from s In order to finish the proof of Theorem 3.3, we need to show that using the recurrence (3) 
Proof of Theorem 3.1 Consider an instance of p-LOCAL SEARCH ON POTENTIAL
. Let T = {t 1 , . . . , t | | } be the multiset of terminals and let s be a strategy profile. Recall that p-LOCAL SEARCH ON POTENTIAL asks whether at most k players can change their strategies in such a way that the potential decreases. Observe that we can assume that exactly k players are going to change their strategies because some of these players can choose their old strategies. There are | | k possibilities to choose a set of k players 0 ⊆ . We consider all possible choices and for each set 0 , we check whether the players from this set can apply some strategy to decrease . Denote by X ⊆ T the multiset of terminals of the players from 0 , and let s = s − 0 . We compute the potential (s ) for this strategy profile. Now we redefine the cost of edges as follows: for each e ∈ E(G) and h ≥ 1, c e (h) = c e (n e (s ) + h). Clearly, c e (h) ≥ 0 and c e (h) ≥ c e (h + 1). Let be the potential for these edge costs. We find the minimum value of (s * ) for the set of players 0 and the corresponding terminals X. It remains to observe that (s ) (1) and the claim follows.
Intractability of Local Search for Rosenthal Potential
This section is devoted to the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 p-LOCAL SEARCH ON POTENTIAL , where is Rosenthal potential for multicasting game, is W[1]-hard.
Before we give the proof, let us remind a classical inequality that will be useful. 
Let us note that by changing the sign of f we obtain that for concave functions the same result holds, but with inequality reversed.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof We provide an FPT reduction from the MULTICOLOURED CLIQUE problem, which is known to be W[1]-hard [11] .
Observe that by the assumption that each V i is an independent set, the clique C has to contain exactly one vertex from each part V i .
We take an instance (H, k) of MULTICOLOURED CLIQUE and construct an instance (G, s, k(k − 1)) of p-LOCAL SEARCH ON POTENTIAL . First, we provide the construction of the new instance; then, we prove that the constructed instance is equivalent to the input instance of MULTICOLOURED CLIQUE. During the reduction we assume k to be large enough; for constant k we solve the instance (H, k) in polynomial time by a brute-force search and output a trivial YES or NO instance of p-LOCAL SEARCH ON POTENTIAL .
Construction. First create the root vertex r. For every u ∈ V i , we create k vertices: u and u 1 , . . . , u i−1 , u i+1 , . . . , u k . Denote by F u the set {u 1 , . . . , u i−1 , u i+1 , . . . , u k }. We connect the created vertices in the following manner: we construct one arc (r, u) with cost R = k 2 , and for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , k} we construct arc (u, u j ) with cost 0. With every vertex u j for all u ∈ V (H ) we associate a player that builds a path from r to u j . In the initial strategy profile s, each of (k − 1)|V (H )| players builds a path that leads to his vertex via the corresponding vertex u. Observe that the potential of this strategy profile is equal to |V (H )| · R · H(k − 1).
We now construct the part of the graph that is responsible for the choice of the clique. We create a pseudo-root r and an arc (r, r ) with cost
The value of W is tailored to separate cliques in H from subgraphs that lack at least one edge using budget constraints; the meaning of every summands For every edge uv ∈ E(H ), where u ∈ V i and v ∈ V j , i = j , we create a vertex x uv , arc (r , x uv ) of cost 1, and arcs (x uv , u j ), (x uv , v i ) of cost 0. This concludes the construction shown in Fig. 1 .
Before we proceed with the formal proof of the theorem, let us give some intuition behind the construction. Given a clique C in H , we can construct a common strategy of k(k − 1) players assigned to vertices from u∈V (C) F u , who can agree to jointly rebuild their paths via the pseudo-root r . The "cost of entrance" for remodelling the strategy in this manner is paying for the expensive arc (r, r ); however, this can amortised by sharing cheap arcs (r , x uv ) for uv ∈ E(C). The costs have been chosen so that only the maximum possibility of sharing, which corresponds to a clique in H , can yield a decrease of the potential.
From a clique to a remodelled strategy profile. Assume that C is a clique in H with k vertices. Let us remind, that in the initial strategy profile s each player is using the corresponding arc (r, u) for his path. We construct the new strategy profile s by changing strategies of k(k − 1) players as follows. For every uv ∈ E(C), where u ∈ V i and v ∈ V j , i = j , the players associated with vertices u j and v i reroute their paths so that in s they lead via r and x uv to respective targets. In comparison to the profile s, the new profile s :
• has congestion withdrawn from arcs (r, u) for u ∈ V (C)-this decreases the potential by k · R · H(k − 1); • has congestion introduced to arcs (r, r ) and (r , x uv ) for uv ∈ E(C)-this increases the potential by W · H(k(k − 1)) + From a remodelled strategy profile to a clique. Recall that s is an initial strategy profile each player uses the corresponding arc (r, u) for his path. Let s be a strategy profile such that (s ) < (s) and D(s, s ) = ≤ k(k − 1). Let L be the set of players who have rebuilt their strategies in s ; then |L| = . Let p be a player in L, who is assigned to a vertex u j ∈ F u for some u ∈ V (H ). Observe, that the only possibility of rebuilding the strategy for p is to choose a path leading through r and a vertex x uv for some uv ∈ E(H ), v ∈ V j . We now examine all the arcs of the graph G with nonzero costs in order to provide a lower bound on = (s ) − (s). We partition the arcs into three classes: (i) arcs (r, u) for u ∈ V (H ), (ii) arc (r, r ), and (iii) arcs (r , x uv ) for uv ∈ E(H ). For each of these classes we analyze the contribution to the difference ; by this we mean the difference of contributions to potentials (s ) and (s) from the corresponding arcs.
Firstly, consider arcs (r, u) for u ∈ V (H ). In total, players withdraw their paths from these arcs. The contribution to s of these arcs is equal to u∈V (H ) R · H(a u ), where a u is the number of players using the arc (r, u) in strategy profile s . We know that u∈V (H ) a u = (k − 1)|V (H )| − , while 0 ≤ a u ≤ k − 1 for all u ∈ V (H ). Observe that then the sequence (a u ) is majorized by a sequence consisting of |V (H )| − k−1 − 1 terms (k − 1), one term (k − 1) − ( mod (k − 1)), and k−1 zeroes. Therefore, since H can be extended to a concave function, by Theorem 4.3 we infer that: of the arcs of the form (r , x uv ) is at least they have to share an arc outgoing from r , so there has to exist a vertex x u i u j and the corresponding arc (r , x u i u j ). From the construction of G we infer that u i u j ∈ E(H ).
